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Originalism is a term fraught with controversy; it is usually associated
with "conservative" results in constitutional interpretation, including most
recently the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. The
application of originalism to the interpretation of the Sixth and the Seventh
Amendments, however, seems to defy this view. Using an originalist
approach, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the jury trial right, as a
general matter, holding, for example, that a jury must find facts that influence
sentencing and that a jury trial right exists for some congressionally created
causes of action.
Despite the Court's endorsement of an originalist approach to the
constitutional right to a jury trial, the Court's decisions have sometimes
fallen short of the original meaning of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. A
few years ago I wrote an article entitled "Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional" in which I challenged the accepted constitutionality of the
common procedure of summary judgment. While writing this article and
others challenging procedure under the Seventh Amendment, I became
interested in the scholarship and decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia on
originalism and the jury. Justice Scalia's scholarship, including A Matter Of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, and Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, have caused people to think about the applicability of originalism to the
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Scalia's decisions on sentencing, the
confrontation clause and other jury trial right questions have confounded
traditional views on the conservative and liberal lines in judicial
interpretation, including the application of originalism.
The idea for this Symposium on Originalism and the Jury, co-sponsored
by The Ohio State University and the University of Illinois, was born at a
breakfast with Judge Jeffrey Sutton. Judge Sutton, an OSU law graduate and
former clerk of Justice Scalia, was also interested in these jury issues and
was interested in bringing Justice Scalia to Ohio State. Judge Sutton quickly
enlisted then Ohio State Law Dean Nancy Rogers and Douglas Berman to
help plan for an event at Ohio State. And both Judge Sutton and another
former clerk to Justice Scalia, Brian Fitzpatrick, were able to secure the
participation of Justice Scalia.
We had a wonderful program including a Keynote Address by Justice
Scalia, and panels on The Framers and the Jury, the Seventh Amendment
Civil Jury Trial, the Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Trial, and Originalism
in Advocacy, respectively moderated by Illinois Dean Bruce Smith, Deborah
Merritt, Ohio State Dean Alan Michaels and Judge Sutton. In addition to the
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moderators and the authors mentioned below, several others participated on
the panels, including Stephanos Bibas, Michael Dreeben, Jeffrey Fisher, Orin
Kerr, and Carter Phillips. We feel fortunate to have had such a distinguished
group of people participate in the Symposium and write for this Symposium
issue.
There are many people to thank for this Symposium in addition to the
people already mentioned. Thanks to Dean Michaels and Associate Dean
Garry Jenkins for their work on the event. Louis Billionis, my former Dean at
the University of Cincinnati, and Ralph Brubaker, an Interim Dean at Illinois,
should also be thanked for preliminary discussions about this Symposium.
Finally, the Symposium Editor, Nathan Colvin, did a wonderful job
organizing and putting on the event. Of course, the new Ohio State Law
Journal board with Editor-in-Chief Jessica Kim at the helm performed the
hard work of cite-checking and editing these-sometimes heavy on the
English common law-articles.
This Symposium issue includes provocative articles that use originalism
and challenge accepted notions of the role of the jury. Doug Berman makes
the case for jury involvement with federal habeas corpus actions. He argues
that a jury role reviewing the constitutionality and lawfulness of criminal
convictions would have been welcomed by the Constitution's Framers and
would help reform the current problems in habeas review. Judge Nancy
Gertner also writes about a broader criminal jury trial right. She contends that
informing juries of mandatory sentencing and mandatory enhancements
would give more "intelligible content" to the criminal jury trial right. Joan
Larsen also writing about the criminal jury describes the relationship
between the criminal jury of the founding era and the modem jury. She
concludes that some aspects of the original jury should be restored including
unanimity and twelve-person juries.
Brian Fitzpatrick explores the civil jury trial right and takes on my
argument against summary judgment. He argues that to decide whether
summary judgment is unconstitutional the importance of English juries
deciding the sufficiency of the evidence as well as changes made to the jury
trial since the late eighteenth century must be considered. James Oldham also
addresses limitations to the civil jury trial right by arguing for a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment. His contentions are based on two
characteristics of business litigation in England in the late eighteenth
century-the frequent referral of cases to arbitration and the strong
likelihood that a case that went to trial would be tried by a special jury of
merchants. Like Oldham, in another article, Gene Schaerr and Jed Brinton
discuss the civil jury trial right in the context of modem business litigation.
They contend that the Framers did not envision modem business when they
established the civil jury trial right, and as a result, certain rules in the legal
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system become very important, including regarding juror qualifications,
financing of litigation, and punitive damages.
Somewhat differently than the others who write on the civil jury trial
right in this issue, I argue that the right has been inappropriately limited.
Using the English common law, I show that the right should be understood as
a limitation on Congress, in addition to a limitation on the courts, and that
any actions with damages, including ones currently before administrative
agencies and bankruptcy courts, should be tried to juries. Finally, William
Nelson explores the extent of lawfinding power of colonial American juries,
including through the questions of whether law was under the control of local
communities, or did law represent the enforceable will of central political
authorities. His conclusion from his research thus far is juries possessed such
power in some states, and they did not in others. He also finds, however, that,
for the most part, localities had the power to resist centrally imposed law.
We hope these articles shed new light on this interesting issue of
Originalism and the Jury.

